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The Impact of Epic Systems in the
Labor and Employment Context
Lise Gelernter *

INTRODUCTION
Epic Systems not only had an impact on the law of arbitration, but it also
affected federal labor and employment law and policy. The main question in the
case was whether an employee’s agreement to a class or collective action waiver 1
violated the National Labor Relation Act’s (NLRA) protection for workers
engaging in “concerted activities.” 2 Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA 3 protect
workers against adverse employment action due to the exercise of their “right to
self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.” 4 In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court ruled that instituting a class or
collective claim did not count as the type of “concerted activities” that the NLRA
protects, even though it involves an activity that can be used for the “mutual aid or
protection” of a group of employees. 5
The Epic Systems case, like many of the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration
decisions, highlights the sometimes dissonant interplay between two previously
separate bodies of law that have converged in the last 27 years: 1) the legal
doctrine developed under the Federal Arbitration Act 6 (FAA), which Congress
passed in 1925 to allow for federal court enforcement of arbitration agreements;
and 2) legal doctrines arising from federal labor, employment discrimination, and
worker protection laws that include the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 7
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 8 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 9 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. 10
* Teaching Faculty, University at Buffalo School of Law. The author would like to thank Rafael
Gely, Director of the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution and James E. Campbell Missouri
Endowed Professor of Law at the University of Missouri Law School, for his encouragement and
support; and Martin Malin, Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Institute for Law and the
Workplace, Chicago-Kent College of Law, for his insightful and helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this paper.
1. The arbitration agreements in question required employees to pursue claims on an individual
basis only.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (2018).
3. Id.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added).
5. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1642-26 (2018).
6. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2018).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2018).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 185-88 (2018). § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, authorizes courts to enforce
arbitration agreements that are part of collective bargaining agreements between a union and an
employer. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). Although
historically courts had viewed the FAA and LMRA arbitration regimes as existing in two separate
legal worlds of commercial arbitration and union related-grievance arbitration, the Court’s decision in
14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett suggested otherwise. 14 Penn Plaza, L.L.C. v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 254 (2009).
In Pyett, an employer used the FAA, not Section 301 of the LMRA, as the basis for its motion to
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This further penetration of the FAA into the zone of labor and employment
law has three notable impacts: 1) because class action waivers mostly affect nonunionized workers and have become more prevalent every year, many workers
will not be able to bring class or collective actions and will be unable to enforce
their rights under employment contracts and worker protection laws; 2) limiting
the breadth of the rights that NLRA § 7 protects; and 3) the carrying forward of
Circuit City’s 11 differential treatment under the FAA of “transportation workers”
and all other workers. I will discuss each impact in more detail below.

I. THE BIGGEST EFFECT IS ON NON-UNIONIZED WORKERS
Epic Systems says, essentially, that the NLRA does not stand in the way of
employers making it a condition of employment for workers to sign agreements to
arbitrate all employment disputes and to waive their right to bring class or
collective actions. 12 Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility v.
Concepción 13 and American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant 14 rejected other
challenges to the enforceability of class action waivers, employers have almost no
barriers to requiring employees to sign them.
This will have the greatest impact on non-unionized workers for two reasons.
First, for unionized workers, the NLRA would require an employer to bargain in
good faith with a union about a class action waiver because it arguably involves a
mandatory subject of bargaining in relation to a term or condition of work. In
addition, an employer could not try to get individual employees to sign waivers
without an agreement with the union. 15 A union would be unlikely to consent to a
class action waiver because it would contravene its core mission. By virtue of its
representative status, a union bringing a dispute to arbitration or acting in any
other collective bargaining capacity is essentially acting on behalf of the class of
all affected employees. That is why it is called collective bargaining.
Second, at unionized workplaces, there is already a highly developed
arbitration process that is enforceable under LMRA § 301. 16 Pursuant to 99% of
union-management contracts, arbitration is the final step in a multi-step grievance
compel the arbitration of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement. Id. Neither the majority nor
the dissent in Pyett commented on the fact that Section 301 could or should have been the basis for the
motion. The majority opinion in Epic Systems took that legal convergence even further by finding that
the FAA also affected the scope of NLRA § 7 protections for employees’ concerted activity.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2018).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2018).
11. Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
12. For purposes of this paper, I will use the term “class action waivers” to mean both class and
collective actions.
13. AT&T Mobility v. Concepción, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
14. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (d); see Ga. Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 427 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (11th Cir.
2005) (grievance arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargaining); United Elec., Radio and Mach.
Workers of Am. v. N.L.R.B., 409 F.2d 150, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (same); Bargaining in Good Faith
with Employees’ Union Representative (Section 8(d) & 8(a)(5)), NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD,
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/bargaining-good-faith-employees-unionrepresentative-section (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); see generally ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W.
FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, §§ 21.1, 21.4 (West 2d ed. 2004).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
455-56 (1957).
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process. 17 Both unions and employers are accustomed to the way the grievance
arbitration system functions and have no incentive to seek to create a new one
where each employee would have to pursue employment disputes on an individual
basis. Class action waivers in unionized workplaces would result in employers
losing the benefit of having only one entity to deal with on all workplace disputes,
and, as stated earlier, unions losing a large part of their representative
responsibilities.

A. The Numbers.
Employers clearly think or have been advised that using class action waivers
in conjunction with mandatory arbitration agreements is advantageous for them
because they are becoming standard requirements at many workplaces. Professor
Alexander J.S. Colvin reported in April 2018 that 53.9% of non-union private
sector employers require mandatory arbitration agreements, which translates into
56.2% of non-union employees (or 60 million workers). 18 Of those employers
using mandatory arbitration agreements, 30.1% require class action waivers. 19
That number is likely to climb. Right after Epic Systems was decided, Ron
Chapman, a prominent management attorney, predicted that employers would
increase their use of class action waivers in arbitration agreements
“significantly.” 20 Law 360 reported further:
“Prior to today, the use of arbitration agreements was fairly common. Three
months from now, it’ll be the norm,” said Chapman, whose firm just hours after
the high court’s ruling unveiled an automated tool that prepares custom arbitration
agreements containing class waivers based on employers’ requirements and
preferences. 21
Since only 10.7% of employees in the private sector work at unionized
workplaces, 22 this means that the majority of people working in the United States
have signed or soon will be signing class action waivers.
This phenomenon affects the efficacy of worker protection laws. As the
majority in Italian Colors 23 acknowledged and the dissent complained in Epic
Systems, 24 making victims unable to bring class or collective actions may allow
wrongdoers to escape liability for legal violations because without a class action,
it would be impossible to mount any kind of legal action to vindicate low-value
individual claims. By removing the possibility of relying on the NLRA’s
protections for concerted activity to defeat class action waivers, Epic Systems

17. LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN, RICHARD A. BALES & STEPHEN F. BEFORT, ADR IN THE
WORKPLACE 20 (3d ed. 2014), citing BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (BNA 14th ed. 1995).
18. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST. 2 (Apr.
6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration/.
19. Id.
20. Vin Gurrieri, 5 Takeaways From Employers’ Win on Class Waivers, LAW 360 (May 21, 2018),
https://www.law360.com/employment/articles/1045759/5-takeaways-from-employers-win-on-classwaivers.
21. Id.
22. Union Members Summary, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR (2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release
/union2.nr0.htm. The latest statistics reflect union participation in calendar year 2017.
23. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
24. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1642-26 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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effectively wiped out many minimum wage, health and safety, and employment
discrimination claims. 25

B. Union Organizing Opportunity?
Some in the union community think that non-union employers’ use of
mandatory arbitration clauses and class action waivers could become a rallying
cry for union organizing. 26 For example, if individual workers think their
employers are cheating them on their wages but cannot find a lawyer who will
take their individual cases to arbitration, they might be attracted to a union’s free,
collective representation for workers in arbitration proceedings on disputes over
terms and conditions of work. However, it may be difficult for unions to use Epic
Systems as an effective organizing tool for two reasons. First, unions would have
to know where workers have felt the negative impact of a class action waiver,
something that may be difficult to discover. Second, being able to translate the
arcane legal doctrine of arbitration into an organizing tool would require
organizers to have the time to explain what arbitration and class action waivers are
and why it would be to a worker’s advantage to have union representation in a
grievance arbitration system. Often, union organizers do not have the luxury of
much time in face-to-face meetings or space in written materials to get their
information across in the quick conversations they might have with workers at
shift changes, or in e-mails or social media postings that need to grab a reader’s
attention quickly.

C. Be Careful of What You Wish for
Some employers may not benefit as much as they had hoped from class action
waivers. Arbitrators of disputes over employment discrimination and minimum
wage laws are reporting, anecdotally, that enterprising plaintiff attorneys are
bringing individual arbitration actions for multiple plaintiffs with the same type of
claims. As a result, employers can be hit with hundreds of thousands of dollars in
fees for multiple arbitration proceedings, especially if they use the rules of the
American Arbitration Association, which require employers to pay all arbitration
fees in employment cases. 27 This can lead to employers becoming interested in
consolidating the cases in some way, or using one or more of the cases as a test
case. 28 This makes the arbitration process more efficient and also helps to lead to
25. Professor Cynthia Estlund’s empirical study on the volume of employment arbitration claims
filed showed that mandatory arbitration clauses actually suppress the initiation of otherwise viable
claims. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679 (2018).
She concluded: “It now appears that, by imposing mandatory arbitration on its employees, an employer
can ensure that it will face only a miniscule chance of ever having to answer for future legal
misconduct against employees. Such a provision amounts to a virtual ex ante waiver of substantive
rights that the law declares non-waivable.” Id. at 707.
26. See, e.g., Kevin Gundlach, Wisconsin’s Civil Service Will Rise Again (June 11, 2016), https:
//host.madison.com/ct/opinion/column/kevin-gundlach-wisconsin-s-civil-service-will-riseagain/article_5b69acaa-7596-57f6-9695-c2dd88d49859.html.
27. Martin H. Malin, The Employment Decisions of the Supreme Court’s 2012-13 Term, 29 ABA J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 203, 213-14 (2014).
28. The author’s telephone and e-mail interviews with Ira Cure, Arbitrator, member of the National
Academy of Arbitrators (6/5/18), and Martin F. Scheinman, Esq., Arbitrator, member of the National
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more consistent results, much as a class action would. The American Arbitration
Association, which administers many arbitration proceedings concerning
individual employment disputes, has developed rules for handling multi-plaintiff
cases so that the arbitration process remains fair, efficient, and worthwhile. 29
Employers facing multiple individual claims also have to consider whether it
is worth the cost of paying arbitrators’ and experts’ fees in 10, 20, 100 or a 1,000
cases when the fees can typically range from $1,000 to $5,000 per day. 30 Each
individual plaintiff, if he or she is required to pay part of a fee, only has to pay it
once, whereas the employer would have to pay the fees in each case filed. 31
Another potential problem for employers who ban collective actions is that
they will not be able to take advantage of a claimant’s loss (the employer’s win) in
an arbitration proceeding in subsequent cases with similar claims. Because
collateral estoppel binds only the parties to a particular proceeding, one individual
case result cannot bind another claimant who was not a party in the earlier
proceeding. 32 Thus, a claimant could win on the same type of claim that resulted
in a loss for another claimant. Conversely, claimants could use the collateral
estoppel effect of one claimant’s “win” to an employer’s detriment. Since the
employer will be a party in every proceeding, the employer would be bound by an
earlier case’s result if the same issues were litigated in subsequent cases.

II. DEFINING THE BREADTH OF THE PROTECTIONS OFFERED BY NLRA § 7
One of the more important rulings in Epic Systems concerns how broadly to
interpret NLRA § 7’s protection for “concerted activities.” NLRA § 7 provides
employees: “the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 33 The question in Epic Systems was
whether bringing a class action was a protected “concerted” activity and if so,
whether class action waivers were nonetheless enforceable.
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority in Epic Systems, said there were
several reasons why NLRA § 7 was not even implicated by the enforcement of
class action waivers. First, he explained, engaging in “concerted activities” could
not possibly include instituting collective or class actions in court because “class
or collective procedures . . . were hardly known when the NLRA was adopted in
1935.” 34 Second, he found that the term “concerted activities” was limited by the
Academy of Arbitrators (6/5/18). The fact that employment arbitrators are dealing increasingly with
multi-plaintiff claims of a similar nature is reflected in the meeting session entitled “Complex
Procedural Issues in the Arbitration of Mass Employment Claims” at the May 2018 meeting of the
National Academy of Arbitrators.
29. E-mail exchange with Martin Scheinman, Founder, Scheinman Arbitration and Mediation
Services (on file with author).
30. Deborah Rothman, Trends in Arbitrator Compensation, DISP. RES. MAGAZINE 8 (2017), https
://www.americanbar.org/.../3_rothman_trends_in_arbitrator.authcheckdam.pdf.
31. Many plaintiffs do not pay arbitrator fees in mandatory arbitration systems. For example, AAA’s
rules require the employer to do so. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 34 (2016), available at adr.org/employment.
32. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 468 (2018).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018) (emphasis added).
34. Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1624.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

5

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2019, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 10

120

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2019

list of specific rights preceding it in Section 7: “the right to self-organization, to
form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively.” 35 He used the
interpretive canon of ejusdem generis to reach this conclusion, reasoning that
when “a more general term follows more specific terms in a list, the general term
is usually understood” to be limited by the more specific terms. 36 He concluded:
All of which suggests that the term “other concerted activities” should,
like the terms that precede it, serve to protect things employees “just do”
for themselves in the course of exercising their right to free association in
the workplace, rather than “the highly regulated, courtroom-bound
‘activities’ of class and joint litigation.” 37
Because the terms that precede “concerted activities” in Section 7 do not have
anything to do with “the procedures judges or arbitrators must apply in disputes
that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum,” Justice
Gorsuch wrote, “There is no textually sound reason to suppose the final catchall
term [“concerted activities”] should bear such a radically different object than all
its predecessors.” 38
Third, Justice Gorsuch argued, the NLRA’s “broader structure” supports the
conclusion that Section 7 does not protect the right to bring a class or collective
action. 39 He listed all the things that the NLRA explicitly covers: union
recognition by employers, obligations to bargain collectively, picketing, strikes,
and adjudication of disputes by the National Labor Relations Board. He then
noted: “But missing entirely from this careful regime is any hint about what rules
should govern the adjudication of class or collective actions in court or
arbitration.” 40 This statutory silence on anything touching on class or collective
procedures meant that NLRA § 7 protection for “concerted activities” did not
extend to class or collective actions, according to the majority’s opinion. 41
Does this mean that NLRA § 7 now has to be understood to protect only
concerted activities directly related to collective bargaining activities or union
organizing? I do not think the majority’s opinion went that far. Justice Gorsuch
characterized protected Section 7 activities as things that employees “just do” in
order to exercise their right to free association. 42 He did not limit “concerted
activities” to things directly related to collective bargaining or union organizing
activity. This is consistent with longstanding NLRB and federal court doctrines
that have applied the same tests for Section 7 protection for “concerted activity” to
non-unionized and unionized workers alike. 43 Relatively recent examples of the
application of Section 7’s concerted activity protection for actions unrelated to
35. Id. at 1626-27.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Alt. Entm’t, 858 F.3d 393, 414-15 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1625-26.
40. Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1625.
41. Id. at 1626.
42. Id. at 1625.
43. See N.L.R.B. v. Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9, 14-16 (1962) (holding that walkout of nonunionized workers due to bitter cold was “concerted activity”). See also N.L.R.B., OFFICE OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL, OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (Aug. 18, 2011).
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collective bargaining or union organizing can be found in the cases in which the
NLRB found that non-union employees who posted Facebook gripes that were
true “concerted activities” received Section 7 protection. 44
In addition, the majority opinion in Epic Systems focused narrowly on the
issue of Section 7 protection for using a class or collective action procedure in a
judicial or arbitration proceeding. The opinion did not upset the many previous
court decisions, finding that Section 7 protected the other “myriad ways in which
employees may join together to advance their shared interests” that Justice
Ginsburg listed in her dissent. 45 Those cases involved “concerted appeals” to the
media, legislators, and government agencies. 46
The upshot is that in terms of defining the reach of Section 7’s protections for
“concerted activities,” Epic Systems should be read to do no more than exclude
from Section 7 protection the litigation procedures of class and collective
actions. 47 To be sure, this contradicted the legal thinking of four dissenting
justices and many labor relations professionals who had thought that employee
class and collective lawsuits were the very definition of “concerted activities”
carried out for the mutual benefit and aid of a class of employees. Nonetheless,
the decision’s effect on Section 7 jurisprudence should not be extended beyond its
application to class and collective actions.

III. THE FAA’S “TRANSPORTATION WORKERS” EXEMPTION AND EPIC
SYSTEMS.
Another impact of the Epic Systems decision is that it perpetuates and extends
the impact of the division between transportation workers and all other workers
that the Supreme Court created in the Circuit City case. 48 Because the FAA does
not apply to the “contracts of employment” of “transportation workers,” 49 Epic
Systems, based on the FAA, does not give the courts any authority to enforce class
action waivers against them. This is emblematic of the continuing and unexpected
effects of the Supreme Court’s anomalous differentiation in Circuit City.

A. The Circuit City Case
In the Circuit City case, Saint Clair Adams, a non-unionized employee at a
Circuit City store, filed an employment discrimination claim in court against his
employer. Circuit City sought to compel arbitration of his claims pursuant to the
FAA due to the fact that he had signed an employment application that said he
would “settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies
arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for employment,
44. See Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (Aug. 22, 2014) aff’d Three D, LLC v. N.L.R.B., 629
Fed Appx. 33 (2d Cir. 2015). See also Karl Knauz Motor, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (Sept. 28,
2012); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Dec. 14, 2012).
45. Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1637 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1637-38.
47. The limited effect on the interpretation of Section 7 does not, of course, diminish the overall
impact of the majority’s decision enforcing the class action waivers. As discussed in Part I, Epic
Systems will greatly reduce the availability of class action relief and the enforcement of worker
protection laws for non-unionized employees.
48. See Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
49. Id. at 109.
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employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City, exclusively by
final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator.” 50 Circuit City based its
motion on Section 2 of the FAA, which requires courts to enforce arbitration
agreements. 51
Adams argued that the FAA did not apply to him because Section 1 of the
FAA exempted “contracts of employment” from the statute. Section 1 states that
“nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.” 52 Adams argued that he fell within the “any other class of workers”
that were exempt from the statute.
The 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court used the interpretive canon of
ejusdem generis to examine FAA § 1 as they would later do in Epic Systems to
examine the rights that NLRA § 7 protects. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, stated that the canon required that “‘[w]here general words follow
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words.’” 53 Therefore, he reasoned, in FAA § 1, the preceding
terms of “seamen” and “railroad employees,” limited “any other class of workers”
to those workers similar to seamen and railroad employees. He concluded:
“Section 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation
workers.” 54

B. The Fallout from Circuit City.
Justice Kennedy did not define the term “transportation workers” in Circuit
City, which has led to some confusion over what a worker has to do in order to be
exempt from the FAA. The Supreme Court has not had or taken the opportunity
to clarify this further. This has led to many cases in which the parties dispute
whether or not an employee is a “transportation worker.” 55
The difficulty in drawing the line is illustrated by comparing Lenz v. Yellow
Transportation, Inc. 56 and Palcko v. Airborne Express. 57 In Lenz, a trucking
company’s Customer Service Representative argued that his employer could not
use the FAA to enforce an arbitration agreement against him because he was an
exempt “transportation employee.” He did not drive trucks, but he assisted
customers in arranging for their goods to be transported from one place to the
other. Using an amalgam of factors that other courts had used to determine the
“transportation worker” status of other employees, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that the Customer Service Representative was not a “transportation worker.” This
50. Id. at 109-10.
51. Id. at 124; 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). Section 2 provides: “[a] written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
52. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (emphasis added).
53. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115 (citing NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (1991)).
54. Id. at 119.
55. See, e.g., cases discussed in Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348, 351-52 (8th Cir. 2005).
56. Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 2005).
57. Palcko v. Airborne Express, 372 F.3d 588 (3rd Cir. 2004).
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was due mainly to the fact that the employee did not directly transport goods in
interstate commerce, did not handle the packages that the truckers transported, and
did not supervise truckers. 58
In Palcko, the Third Circuit held that a Field Service Representative at a
package delivery company was a transportation worker exempted from the FAA. 59
Although she, like the Customer Service Representative in Lenz, did not drive the
trucks that delivered the packages, nor did she handle the packages, she
supervised the drivers who performed those tasks. The Court found that the
“direct supervision of package shipments makes Palcko’s work ‘so closely related
[to interstate and foreign commerce] as to be in practical effect part of it.’” 60
Because determining whether a worker is a “transportation worker” is so factdependent, it is difficult to predict if a worker in any type of transportation-related
company is exempt from the FAA unless he or she directly transports goods or
people as a seaman, 61 railroad engineer, airplane pilot, or driver of a car, truck or
bus engaged in interstate commerce. Determining the exemption status of all the
other workers in the transportation industry requires a very fact-specific inquiry
with few clear guidelines. Although a majority of the Supreme Court considers
the FAA to be a very clear congressional mandate to enforce arbitration
agreements in almost any situation, the standards for determining the applicability
of the FAA itself are totally unclear.

C. An Anomalous Difference in Treatment of Transportation Workers
Given the fact that the NLRA, 62 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 63 and
worker-protection laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act 64 do not treat
transportation-related workers differently from other workers in terms of their
basic rights, the Circuit City decision created an anomalous differentiation among
workers that is not consistent with federal labor and employment policy. Why
should a customer service representative at a trucking company who is subject to
the FAA have to comply with a mandatory arbitration agreement, but not a driver
for that same company, particularly if they are in the same bargaining unit? Why
should the people in a bus company involved in scheduling and making bus routes
have to comply with the FAA, but the bus drivers do not? All of them receive the
same protections under the NLRA, the FLSA, and employment discrimination
58. Lenz, 431 F.3d at 352-53.
59. Palcko, 372 F.3d at 593.
60. Id. (quoting Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450,
452 (3d Cir.1953)).
61. Id. Because there is no statutory definition of “seaman,” this is not a clear-cut term. There are
multipart judicial tests for determining who is a “seaman” working on a qualifying “vessel.” Chandris,
Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 376-77 (1995); Burks v. Am. River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir.
1982). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the definition of “vessel” was so broad that
“[n]o doubt the three men in a tub would also fit within our definition [of vessel], and one probably
could make a convincing case for Jonah inside the whale.” Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1978) (definition of “employee” covered by the NLRA).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1991) (definition of “employee covered by Title VII).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-14 (2018); see 29 U.S.C. § 203(e); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S.
148, 152 (1947). In determining how broadly to read the FLSA’s coverage of employees, the Supreme
Court held: “The [FLSA’s] purpose as to wages was to insure that every person whose employment
contemplated compensation should not be compelled to sell his services for less than the prescribed
minimum wage.” Id.
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laws. The FAA’s division between transportation and non-transportation workers
stands out for its inconsistency with all other laws regulating employment
relationships.
In Circuit City, Justice Kennedy stated that it was “reasonable to assume that
Congress excluded ‘seamen’ and ‘railroad employees’ from the FAA for the
simple reason that it did not wish to unsettle established or developing statutory
dispute resolution schemes covering specific workers.” 65 He noted that in 1925,
at the time Congress adopted the FAA, it “had already enacted federal legislation
providing for the arbitration of disputes between seamen and their employers,”
and “grievance procedures existed for railroad employees under federal law.” 66
The “any other class of workers” group was understandably linked to seamen and
railroad employees, and was confined to transportation workers who had a
similarly “necessary role in the free flow of goods,” 67 Justice Kennedy reasoned.
In exempting transportation workers from the FAA, Congress reserved “for itself
more specific legislation for those engaged in transportation. . . . Indeed, such
legislation was soon to follow, with the amendment of the Railway Labor Act in
1936 to include air carriers and their employees.” 68 He left out that Congress also
enacted “more specific legislation” concerning arbitration at unionized workplaces
for all other types of workers both within and outside the transportation industries
when it adopted Section 301 of the LMRA in 1947. 69 Yet, pursuant to Circuit
City, non-transportation workers did not become exempt from the FAA even
though “more specific legislation” on arbitration applied to them. Justice Kennedy
never explained why it made any sense for both the FAA and LMRA § 301 to
apply to most unionized workers’ arbitration proceedings, while only LMRA §
301 applies to arbitration processes for unionized “transportation workers.”

D. The Extension of the Impact of the FAA Exemption
Epic Systems carries forward the arbitrary line of demarcation for FAA
applicability between transportation and non-transportation workers. This means
that, for example, truck drivers for a package delivery company would not have to
comply with an arbitration agreement with a class action waiver, whereas the
customer service representative who works with customers and schedules their
deliveries would have to comply with the same agreements. Carrying it even
further, it also means that the FAA would not preempt any state legislation or
doctrine that banned pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements and class
action waivers for the “transportation workers” exempted from the FAA. The
AT&T Mobility and Italian Colors cases, which rest on the FAA’s preemptive
power over state laws or doctrines that interfere with arbitration agreement
enforcement otherwise permitted by the FAA, do not apply to state laws or
doctrines that deal only with arbitration for FAA-exempt “transportation
workers.”

65. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. LMRA § 301 provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreements between unions and
management. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 455-56 (1957).
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Nonetheless, state arbitration laws could interfere with transportation
workers’ freedom from complying with arbitration agreements and class action
waivers. If a state’s arbitration enforcement law applied to employees of all types,
then a business could use state law to enforce, say, a truck driver’s class action
waiver even though it would not be enforceable under the FAA. Most states have
arbitration statutes that are based, more or less, on the Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA), 70 that provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 71 The UAA
does not exempt any type of employment contract from the law and neither do
most state statutes. 72 However, a state’s legal doctrines concerning contract
enforcement might still preclude enforcement of a truck driver’s arbitration
agreement. For example, a state contract doctrine that considered pre-dispute
class action waivers to be unconscionable and unenforceable could apply to FAAexempt workers and would render a class action waiver a nullity. 73
Even if a state arbitration law covered an FAA-exempt worker’s
arbitration agreement, it could be preempted by the FAA’s exemption for certain
“contracts of employment.” After all, the Supreme Court has taken an expansive
view of the FAA’s preemptive effect with respect to state legal doctrines or
statutes that are perceived as disfavoring the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 74 However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has found that the
FAA preemption doctrine does not reach as far as state laws that allow for the
enforcement of more arbitration agreements than the FAA. In Palcko v. Airborne
Express¸ the Third Circuit ruled that the FAA did not preempt the enforcement of
an arbitration agreement pursuant to Washington state’s arbitration law in a case
involving an employee who was FAA-exempt but who was not exempt from the
Washington arbitration law. 75
In its January 15, 2019 decision in New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 76 the Supreme
Court ducked the issue of whether parties can use state arbitration laws to enforce
FAA-exempt arbitration agreements. One of the two questions presented to the
Supreme Court in that case was whether the FAA § 1 exemption for “contracts of
employment” applied to transportation workers who were independent
contractors. The Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit Court of Appeals
and held that the arbitration agreement between a trucking company and a truck
driver who was an independent contractor was exempt from the FAA pursuant to

70. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-19
(2000).
71. 2 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
PROFESSIONALS § 39:18 (2017).
72. Id.
73. California has a “Discover Bank” rule that considers pre-dispute class action waivers in
consumer contracts of adhesion to be unconscionable and unenforceable. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct.
of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1111 (2005). In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2013), the
Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted the “Discover Bank” rule for an agreement covered by
the FAA. However, that preemptive effect would not apply to an agreement that is FAA-exempt.
Although Discover Bank addressed consumer transactions only, its reasoning could easily be extended
to employee contracts of adhesion in which signing a class action waiver is required in order to get a
job.
74. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepción, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
75. Palcko, 372 F.3d at 596.
76. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, No.17-349, 2019 WL 189342 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2019).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

11

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2019, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 10

126

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2019

FAA § 1. 77 But the Supreme Court was completely silent on the possibility of
using state arbitration laws to enforce the agreement, even though the First Circuit
had raised it in its New Prime lower court decision, stating: “We emphasize that
our holding is limited: It applies only when arbitration is sought under the FAA,
and it has no impact on other avenues (such as state law) by which a party may
compel arbitration.” 78

CONCLUSION
The most immediate and direct impact of the Epic Systems ruling falls largely
on non-unionized non-transportation workers who have been required to waive
their right to bring a class or collective action against their employers. It is now
clear that those workers cannot rely on NLRA § 7 to void their waivers. Further,
the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in AT&T Mobility and Italian Colors
establish that those workers cannot rely on any state law or doctrine that bars the
enforcement of the waivers. The increasing use of class action waivers will only
heighten the impact of Epic Systems. The only types of non-unionized workers
who should feel little of the Epic Systems effect are transportation workers, who
are exempted from the FAA.
Whether enforcement of class action waivers will be beneficial for all
employers is an open question. Some employers may find that something like
class action procedures looks good if they have to deal with multiple individual
claims and the costs associated with paying multiple arbitrators to decide those
disputes in potentially inconsistent ways. In addition, some union activists are
hopeful that they can use an employer’s class action waivers as an organizing tool
by offering the alternative of union representation in all types of arbitration
proceedings, including class actions.
Epic Systems also narrowed the breadth of the rights protected under Section
7 of the NLRA when it ruled out Section 7 protection for the procedural options of
class or collective actions. However, the decision should not be read to do more
than address class and collective actions; Justice Gorsuch appeared to be careful to
limit his decision.
Finally, because it is based on the FAA, Epic Systems carries forward the
differing treatment of transportation workers and all other workers under the FAA
that the Supreme Court announced in the Circuit City case. Since Circuit City
established that contracts of employment of transportation workers were exempt
from the FAA, Epic Systems and all the other Supreme Court decisions
concerning the enforceability of arbitration agreements and class action waivers
under the FAA do not apply to them. However, all other workers are subject to
the FAA jurisprudence that allows for enforcement of almost any agreement
having to do with arbitration. This is not consistent with federal labor and
employment policy embodied in anti-discrimination, worker protection, and
collective bargaining laws, which do not treat transportation workers differently
77. Id. at 6-10. The other question at issue in the case was whether a court or an arbitrator should
decide the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was exempt from the FAA when there was a
clause delegating arbitrability and jurisdictional questions to an arbitrator. The Supreme Court also
agreed with the First Circuit on that issue and held that only a court could decide that issue. Id. at 4-6.
78. Oliveira v. New Prime, Inc., 857 F.3d 7, 24, reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (1st Cir. 2017).
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from non-transportation workers. The Epic Systems case only heightens that
inconsistency.
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